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The Return to the
*
Constitution
By HENRY WEIHOFENIn the August issue of DICTA,t Mr. Joseph C. Sampson of the
Denver Bar, under the title, The Lawyer's Oath, issues a trumpet call
to all lawyers to oppose the New Deal in the name of the Constitution.
With the political philosophy therein expressed I do not here wish to
quarrel, but the attempt to read that philosophy into the Constitution
calls for refutation.
Mr. Sampson discusses a number of the most important constitutional cases decided during the last seven years, and disapproves of them
all. Throughout the article, the "present members of the court" are
repeatedly referred to as the main objects of reproof. But, surprisingly,
almost all the cases condemned were decided before the first Roosevelt
appointee went on the bench. When, therefore, Mr. Sampson permits
himself in the heat of argument to refer to "judicial revolutionists," be
must be taken to mean not Justices Black, Frankfurter, et at., but
Hughes, Roberts and Stone, with Hughes serving as Chief Revolutionist,
he having written the opinions in six of the ten cases condemned.
The "judicial revolution," we are told, consists of nothing less
than a discarding of stare decisis and the overruling of "150 years of
precedent."
But when we get down to cases, the new decisions complained of turn out to overrule specifically only three cases. These are
Collector v. Day,1 Hammer v. Dagenhart (the Child Labor case) 2 and
Adkins v. Children's Hospital (the Minimum Wage case),3 decided in
1871, 1918 and 1923 respectively. None of these was supported by
previous decisions; all had been long and strenuously criticized as unjustified by the provisions of the Constitution. It could more justly be
argued that it was the conservative judges who wrote the majority opinions in these cases, especially the child labor and the minimum wage
*The opinions expressed in this article are not necessarily those of the Denver or
Colorado Bar Associations.
'Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado; Special Assistant to the
Attorney General of the United States, 1937-38; author, INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN
CRIMINAL LAW (1933): (with Kenneth C. Sears) MAY'S CRIMINAL LAW (4th ed.
1938) ; articles in various law reviews. Mr. Weihofen wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to Mr. Clay R. Apple of the Greeley, Colorado, Bar for many helpful suggestions and scholarly references.
1(1941) 18 DICTA 202.
'1I Wall. 113, 20 L. ed. 90 (1871).
2247 U. S. 251, 38 S. Ct. 422, 62 L. ed. 939 (1918).
8261 U.S. 525, 43 S. Ct. 394: 67 L. ed. 785 (1923).
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cases, who were the "judicial revolutionists," distorting the language of
the Constitution, and writing into it propositions never intended by the
Framers or suspected by anyone else. The later court in overruling these
decisions has not departed from the Constitution, but returned to it.
That the Constitution is what the Supreme Court says it is, is
denounced as a "new and vicious doctrine." Most lawyers, surely, have
heard this statement of Charles Evans' Hughes 4 too often to find it new,
and it would seem too inevitable a corrolary of our constitutional system
to be deemed vicious. Certainly the Constitution is and always has been
what the Supreme Court said. As construed by John Marshall, th'e
Constitution took on strength which it had not had before, and which
it would not have acquired if Spencer Roane of Virginia had been Chief
Justice in Marshall's place (as he would have been if Ellsworth had held
on to his position for one more month and Jefferson instead of Adams
had had the appointment). Under Taney, social interests acquired recognition which Marshall was willing to give only to private rights.
Under the leadership of Stephen Field, "due process," a modest clause
requiring merely a fair hearing, took on a new and surprising meaning
which made it the principal bulwark of private rights against social control, and thus effected a revolution in our constitutional law-a revolution which was checked only by the coming to the court of Holmes and
Brandeis.
The meaning of the Constitution has fluctuated in response to the
personal opinions of the judges, the influence of Presidents and the exigencies of events. The meaning of interstate commerce has had a meandering history. The Fourteenth Amendment, adopted to protect negroes
against whites, has been metamorphosed into a provision protecting corporations against legislatures. Presidents have overcome adverse decisions
by appointing judges who saw eye to eye with the administration. In
emergencies, the court has upheld vast concentration of power in the
hands of the executive. And all this happened long before 1933.
This process of development, of expansion and contraction, backing and filling, the growth of one constitutional doctrine and the decline
of another-this process did not suddenly come to an end when we graduated from law school. It would be so much more neat, true enough, if
law would stay put, if rules once learned could be counted on to remain
true forever. But this wish for certainty is mere carry-over of the fathercomplex of the child mind.5
Mr. Sampson sagely states that the present court is attempting to
adapt the law and the Constitution to what it conceives to be changing
economic and social conditions. The implications are (1) that the court
is now doing this for the first time, and (2) that it shouldn't be done.
'ADDRESSES AND PAPERS (1st ed. 1908) pp. 139-140.
'See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN I41ND (193 1).

258

DICTA

A reading of any good constitutional history will show that the
court has not usually been so stupid as to ignore the economic and social
conditions upon which the law must operate. Constitutional law is not
a mere abstract, self-contained logic; it does not operate in a vacuum.
There is no nice distinction between legal principles and those which are
economic or sociological. You cannot determine the constitutionality
of a state sales tax on a delivery of goods sent from another state, for
example, except in the light of the economic effect upon such out-of-state
buying. Constitutional law is not divorced from life.
A reexamination of the cases will show that, with the three exceptions mentioned, they do not purport to overrule prior cases, and that
these three eminently deserved overruling.
THE MORATORIUM CASES
In 1934, in the Minnesota Moratorium case,6 the Supreme Court,
speaking through Chief Justice Hughes, upheld the Minnesota statute
designed to meet the desperate situation arising from the depression and
to minimize the losses accruing to both mortgagors and mortgagees from
the flood of foreclosures. The statute provided for limited extensions
of time for foreclosure, upon court order, during the emergency.
With this decision, says Mr. Sampson, "The court first sanctioned
the doctrine of expediency in an alleged (!) economic emergency as an
escape from constitutional limitation on legislative action."
This statement is sufficiently answered by pointing to a long line
of cases upholding emergency legislation.7
More than a hundred years ago, Chancellor Kent denounced the
Charles River Bridge decision' in language very similar to Mr. Sampson's.
The decision, he wrote, "injures the moral sense of the community and
destroys the stability of contracts * * * I have lost my confidence and
'Home Building and Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 54 S. Ct. 231, 78
L. ed. 413.
'The Legal Tender cases, 12 Wall. 457, 20 L. ed. 287 (1871); Juilliard v.
Greenman, 110 U. S.421, 4 S.Ct. 122, 28 L. ed. 204 (1884); Wilson v. New,
243 U. S. 332, 37 S. Ct. 298, 61 L. ed. 755 (1917) ; Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S.
135, 41 S. Ct. 458, 65 L. ed. 865 (1921).
"Emergency laws in time of peace are uncommon, but not unknown. Wholesale
disaster, financial panic, the aftermath of war (Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries &
W. Co., 251 U. S. 146, 161, 40 S. Ct. 106, 64 L. ed. 194). earthquake, pestilence,
famine, and fire, a combination of men or the force of circumstances may, as the alternative of confusion or chaos, demand the enactment of laws that would be thought arbitrary under normal conditions (Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U. S. 16, 18, 19, 25 L. ed.
980; American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S. 47, 31 S. Ct. 200, 55 L. ed. 82)."
People ex rel. Durham Realty Corp. v. LaFetra, 230 N. Y. 429, 130 N. E. 601, 16
A. L. R. 152 (1921).
For a full discussion see Clark, Emergencies and the Larw
(1934), 49 POL. Sc. Q. 268.
'Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420, 9 L.ed. 773 (1837).
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hopes in the constitutional guardianship and protection of the Supreme
Court."9

Today, no one doubts the correctness of that decision.
We live in a society of law, not an anarchy. "Pretty much all law,"
as Mr. Justice Holmes has said, "consists in forbidding men to do some
things that they want to do, and contract is no more exempt from law
than other acts."' 1
The Minnesota Moratorium case held the Minnesota statute a reasonable exercise of the state's police power. Neither creditor nor debtor
was deprived of his property without due process. Both were protected.
Mortgagee interests have largely acceded in this view. That the decision
does not give the states carte blanche in postponing foreclosure was made
sufficiently clear a year later when the court held a somewhat broader
Arkansas statute unconstitutional."
BUSINESS AFFECTED WITH A PUBLIC INTEREST
In 1934, in Nebbia t. New York," the court, in an opinion by
"revolutionist" Mr. Justice Roberts, upheld a New York law regulating
the price of milk.
"Never before," we are told, "had the court permitted governmental regulation of prices except in the case of public utilities, which because
of their monopolistic character, were 'affected with a public interest.' "
This is incorrect. Various businesses not public utilities and not
monopolistic in character had been subjected to price control."3 The
OQuoted in WARREN, CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME
COURT, 269.
1°Dissenting in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 568, 43 S. Ct.
394, 67 L. ed. 785 (1923), citing numerous cases. That contract rights may be
restricted by reasonable exercise of the police power is established by a host of cases:
Northwestern Fertilizer Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659, 24 L. ed. 1036 (1878);
Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 25 L. ed. 1079 (1880) ; Butchers Union Slaughter
House v. Crescent City Co., 111 U. S. 746, 4 S. Ct. 652, 28 L. ed. 585 (1884);
McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, 29 S. Ct. 206, 53 L. ed. 315 (1908); Holden
v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 18 S. Ct. 383, 42 L. ed. 780 (1898) : Muller v. Oregon,
208 U. S. 412, 28 S. Ct. 424, 52 L. ed. 551 (1908), Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S.
426, 37 S. Ct. 435, 61 [.. ed. 830 (1917); Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183
U. S. 13, 22 S. Ct. 1, 46 L. ed. 55 (1901)-to name only a few.
"W. B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U. S. 56. 55 S. Ct. 555, 79 L. ed. 1298
(1935).
See also Treigle v. Acme Homestead Assn., 297 U. S. 189, 56 S. Ct. 408,
80 L. ed. 575 (1936), holding invalid a Louisiana law, undertaking to alter the
contracts of building and loan associations.
"1291 U. S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505, 78 L. ed. 940 (1933).
"Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U. S. 391, 14 S. Ct. 857, 38 L. ed. 757 (1894)
(fixing charges of grain elevators where there was no monopoly) ; German Alliance
Insurance Co. v. Lewis.. 233 U. S. 389, 34 S. Ct. 612, 58 L. ed. 1011 (1914)
(fixing fire insurance rate ) : Block v. -irsh, 256 U. S. 135, 41 S. Ct. 458, 65 L. ed.
865 (1921)
(fixing rents) ; Highland v. Russell Car Zd Snow Plow Co., 279 U. S.
253, 49 S. Ct. 314, 73.L. ed. 688 (1929) (fixing price of coal during war time);
Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U. S. 251, 53 S. Ct. 181, 77 L. ed. 288 (1932) (fixing
rates for contract haulers as well as common carriers).
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court had, however, in previous cases, attempted to employ the concept
of a business "affected with a public interest," and to hold that only
such businesses could be subjected to price control. The term "business
affected with a public interest" had come into the law quite by accident
in 1877.14 It had no meaning then and in half a century of heroic effort
the court had not succeeded in giving it a workable definition. Nebbia
v. New York discarded the impractical phrase. Its passing gives no cause
for grief.
THE GOLD CLAUSE CASES
The Gold Clause Cases 5 are indeed subject to criticism, -but not
because they go too far; rather, because they do not go far enough. In
holding that the government may nullify the gold clauses of private
obligations, the court pointed out that the power of Congress to fix the
value of the dollar and control the currency necessarily includes power
to prevent obstruction to the free flow of that currency, and that no
private contract may be permitted to prevent the exercise of that power.
For the court to have ruled otherwise would have been to nullify the
plainly expressed power. No cases can be cited which these cases overrule; on the contrary, the precedents are all in accord with the result
reached.' 6
As to government obligations, however, the court in the gold cases
refused to follow this reasoning, though it would seem to be as valid
here as in the railroad case. If the gold obligations obstructed the free
flow of the new currency, Congress by a non-discriminatory measure
should have been allowed to include government obligations with all
others in providing for payment in the new currency. The court, however, held the opposite, with the result that while all other obligations
were now payable in the new currency, government bonds were payable
in the old. The staggering burden this would saddle upon the government apparently gave the majority of the court pause, and they held that
though the government had breached the contract, the bondholder could
not recover because he had not proved damages. The government was
branded a defaulter for failing to pay its just debts; and in the next breath
"The term was first presented to the court in argument of counsel in Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. ed. 77 (1877), and casually taken over by the court.
It was supposedly based on a fragmentary statement of Lord Hale's. For the interesting
story of how this phrase was transferred from Hale's forgotten little book to the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution, see Walton Hamilton, Affectation
With a Public Interest, 39 YALE L. J. 1089.
"5 Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 294 U. S. 240, 55 S. Ct. 407, 79
L. ed. 885 (1935); Perry v. United States, 294 U. S. 330, 55 S. Ct. 432, 79 L. ed.
912 (1935).
"The Legal Tender Cases. 12 Wall. 457, 20 L. ed. 287 (1871) : Juilliard v.
Greenman, 110 U. S. 421, 4 S. Ct. 122, 28 L. ed. 204 (1884): Veazie Bank v.
Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 19 L. ed. 482 (1869).
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the bondholder, seeking to collect this just debt, was charged with seeking "unjust enrichment"!
This has been criticized," but not from Mr. Sampson's point of
view. Indeed, it is not clear what his point is. He speaks darkly of the
moral laxity and even moral chaos which the decision supposedly caused,
about which I happily know nothing. Be that as it may, we are not
here discussing theology or morals, but constitutional law. Constitutionally, there is no basis in precedent or in principle for denying to
Congress the power to abrogate gold clauses.
TVA
It is no doubt true that TVA represents a tremendous expansion of
government ownership and operation of industry-socialism, if you
will. Whether this is a good thing or a bad thing is debatable and
debated. But it is a question upon which we must make up our own
minds; the Framers did not settle it for us. Americans have a weakness
for assuming that any strong beliefs they may hold, whether on legal,
political, economic or even religious questions, are certainly embodied in
the Constitution, and that the opposing view is "unconstitutional."
Socialism is a Bad Thing; ergo, it is unconstitutional. The fact that all
the decisions of the Supreme Court are to the contrary' is apparently
immaterial.
Shocking as it may seem to the Mark Hanna school of politics, the
Framers did not write any particular economic philosophy into the Constitution-least of all laissez faire individualism, which was still in ovo,
and did not come into its own until, say, 1830,19 and which found no
support in the United States Supreme Court until the 1890's.
"See, for example, Dickinson, The Gold Decisions, 83 U. OF PA. L. REV. 715.
IAshwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 56 S. Ct. 466, 80 L. ed. 688 (1936);
Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U. S. 217, 38 S. Ct. 112, 62 L. ed. 252 (1917):
Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233, 40 S. Ct. 499, 64 L. ed. 878 (1920) (upholding
North Dakota legislation providing for such enterprises as a state bank, state warehouse,
elevator, flour mill system and state home-building project) : Madera Water Works v.
Madera, 228 U. S. 454, 33 S. Ct. 571, 57 L. ed. 915 (1913); Standard Oil Co. v.
Lincoln, 275 U. S. 504, 48S. Ct. 155, 72 L. id. 395 (1926).
Taxes may be laid for "any purpose in which the state may engage and this covers
almost any private business if the Legislature thinks the state's engagement in it will
help the general public * * *." Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations,
262 U. S. 522, 43 S. Ct. 630, 67 L. ed. 1103 (1923).
"Itis settled by unanimous decisions of this court that the due process clause does
not prevent a state or city from engaging in the business of supplying its-inhabitants
with articles in general use, when it is believed that they cannot be secured at reasonable
prices from the private dealers." Brandeis, J., dissenting in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S.262, 52 S.Ct. 371, 76 L. ed. 747 (1932).
The Framers apparently felt that the Constitution gave the national government
power even "to establish mercantile monopolies." BRANT, STORM OVER THE CONSTITUTION, 133. That the federal government build dams at Muscle Shoals.to control the
Tennessee
River was urged more than a hundred years ago by John C. Calhoun.
"9The year of the repeal of the Corn Laws. as good an arbitrary date as any to
mark the acceptance of laissez faire economics in England.
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In the words of the Mississippi Supreme Court: "The due process
provisions of our constitutions do not enact Adam Smith's concept of
the negative state, one of the main junctions of which would be to stand
aloof from intervention in the social and econmoic life of its citizens.
This concept of the state was probably acted upon in the early history of
this country but has long since been discarded * * * ,20
The assumption that the TVA program is not really a defense
measure, to create power and manufacture nitrates, but is purely a plan
to socialize the domestic electric power business, should certainly be
silenced today, when TVA's contributions to national defense and to
navigation are indisputable. True, the generation and distribution of
electric power is also a large aspect of the program, but the very nature
of the task calls for a combination of these functions; they cannot be
separated.
That the sale of the electric power generated by the dams involves
competition with privately owned utility companies raises no constitutional issue. In spite of much wishful thinking, there is no constitutional protection to a business against competition. On the contrary,
business men themselves do much talking in favor of a competitive system. That the competition comes from a government-owned business
is immaterial. Government may compete with private industry, and
may make full use of its sovereign powers (e. g., taxation) to undersell
and ruin the private industry. The Constitution does not prevent it.21
Whether government should use this power to ruin private industry
is a question of policy to be determined at the polls. If opponents of
such government operations cannot win the electorate to their viewpoint,
they must not scold the courts for refusing to interfere. The Constitution does not empower the courts to do so.
REGULATION OF WAGES
"Until the advent of the present (sic) 'liberal court,' " we are told,
"wage-fixing by government boards, commissions and bureaus had always been held unconstitutional."
Always? Well, to be exact, from 1923 to 1937. In 1923, in
Adkins v. Children'sHospital, 22 the court by a 5-3 decision (practically
5-4) held unconstitutional a District of Columbia act providing for
minimum wages for women. There was no precedent for such a decision. Chief Justice Taft, conservative as he was, dissented, saying, "It
is not the function of this court to hold congressional acts invalid simply
'Albritton v. City of Winona (Miss.)

178 So. 799 (1938).

'Puget Sound Power Z4Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U. S. 619, 54 S. Ct. 542, 78

L. ed. 1025 (1934).
'Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 43 S. Ct. 394, 67 L. ed. 785
(1923).
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because they are passea to carry out economic views which the court believes to be unwise and unsound."
The easy assumption that Mr. Justice Sutherland, speaking for the
majority, spoke with the voice of the Fathers, can in this instance be
specifically disproved. The Fathers had no objection to price fixing.
Most of the original thirteen states passed laws fixing the prices of various
commodities. 23 Indeed, "due process" to the Fathers involved no sub24
stantive restrictions at all, but meant merely "process,"-procedure.
Mr. Justice Sutherland's reasoning in the Adkins case was brilliantly and mercilessly demolished by Thomas Reed Powell. I quote
only one sentence from his conclusion: "As a flagrant instance of insufficient reasons and of a judgment widely regarded as an indefensible judgment, the minimum wage decision has few, if any, rivals. ' ' 2 This was
essentially the verdict of other commentators on the decision, including
Edward S. Corwin, Edwin Borchard, C. G. Haines, and F. B. Sayre. "
When the "present liberal court" (meaning the not-so-liberal court
of 1937) overruled this judicial misfit,2 7 it was not violating the Constitution, but was healing a violation done to it by Mr. Justice Sutherland and his conservative associates.
SALARY TAX CASES
In 1939, the court held that a state may collect income tax on the
The
salary of a federal employe S-overruling Collector u. Da .25reasoning of the court was that such a tax is not a burden on the federal
government. The same reasoning applies to federal taxation of state
employes. The decision is denounced, on the ground that it "nonchalantly overrules a constitutional principle firmly established by former
decisions for a century and a half." The reply can be brief:
'As late as 1841, the city of Mobile had an ordinance fixing the price of bread.
It
This was held valid. Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 137, 36 Am. Dec. 441 (1841).
is interesting to note that this case was quoted with approval in Munn v. Illinois, supra,
note 14. The court in the Munn case pointed out that "it has been customary in England
since time immemorial, and in this country from its colonization, to regulate ferries,
common carriers, hackmen, bakers, millers, warfingers, innkeepers, etc., and in so doing
to fix a maximum of charge to be made for the services rendered, accommodations furnished,
and articles sold."
24
For references to some of the immense literature on this change of meaning of
"due process," see Comm-ager, Constitutional History and the Higher Law, in THE
CONSTITUTION RECONSIDERFD,'225 at 231.
'Powell, The Judiciality of Minimum Wage Legislation (1924) 37 HARV. L.
REV. 545.
'Articles by these and other writers are collected in a booklet entitled THE SUPREME COURT AND MINIMUM WAGE LEGISLATION (1925) compiled by the National
Consumers League.
'West Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 57 S. Ct. 578, 81 L. ed. 703
(1937).
'Graves v. New York ex tel. O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466, 59 S. Ct. 595, 83 L. ed.
927, 120 A. L. R. 1466 (1939).
'11 Wall. 113, 20 L. ed. 122 (1871).
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1. This seems to carry the reverence for precedent to the ultimate
or bad, a precedent must never be overruled.
2. That the court adopted the new rule "nonchalantly" is belied
by the cautious progress of the decisions. a°
The "century and a half" of precedent dates from 1871.
3.
There was no basis for Collector v. Day in prior decisions.
Collector v. Day rested on the ground that an income tax on the
salary of a government employe is a tax on that government. The
O'Keefe case, overruling this, holds that the likelihood of the burden
of such a tax being passed on to the employer-government is too remote.
As a state employe, I can ruefully testify to the correctness of the newer
rule. My federal income tax comes out of my pocket; I have not found
a way to load the burden on the State of Colorado. The present rule is
all too correct. I know.

-good

THE SALES AND USE TAX CASES
Very important cases in this field have been decided in the last few
years. 3 1 They involve economic and legal considerations too complex
to discuss in this cursory article. In general, the justification for permitting states in some instance to tax sales of goods brought in from
other states is to prevent discrimination against local sales. It is not yet
clear how far the states may go in applying such taxes. The court in the
Berwind-White case felt that it was not overruling prior cases, though
admitting that prior dicta were contra. I am inclined to agree with Mr.
Sampson; it is difficult to reconcile the case with some prior decisions.
But this does not mean the case is wrong. The court had already
held that a compensating use tax could be applied to such sales.3 2 To
deny that the same objective can be accomplished by a sales tax would
involve a mere technicality of draftsmanship, rather than any great constitutional principle.
The applicability of modern sales taxes to interstate sales involves
new and complex problems. It is naive to assume that the answers can
'The evolution of the new rule can be traced through James v. Dravo Construction Co., 302 U. S. 134, 58 S. Ct. 208, 82 L. ed. 155 (1937) ; Silas Mason Co. v.
State Tax Commission, 302 U. S. 186, 58 S. Ct. 233, 82 L. ed. 287 (1937); Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U. S. 362, 58 S. Ct. 616, 82 L. ed. 897 (1938); Helveringv. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405,58 S. Ct. 969, 82 L. ed. 1427 (1938).
"Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577, 57 S. Ct. 524, 81 L. ed. 814
(1937) ; McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U. S. 33, 60 S. Ct.
388, 84 L. ed. 565 (1940) : Nelion v. Sears, Roebuck t Co., 312 U. S. 359, 61
S. Ct. 586, 85 L. ed. 622 (1941) and others. Of the many articles discussing the
subject, see, among the latest: McNamara, Jurisdictionaland Interstate Commerce Problems in the Imposition of Excises on Sales (1941) 8 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS 482; Vaske, Are You Selling in Foreign States?
467.
12Henneford
v. Silas Mason Co., supra, note 31.

(Aug., 1941)

19 TAXES
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be found by merely reading the Constitution. The answers must be
worked out with only the broadest constitutional principles to guide the
court. Probably any solution can be supported by appeal to precedents
-and criticised by appeal to other precedents.
NLRB CASES
The line of cases involving the Labor Relations Act has, undoubtedly, extended the concept of interstate commerce further than had previously been conceived. But to say that these cases ignore well established precedents, and that by holding the plants of the Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation to be in the stream of interstate commerce 3 the
court "completely upset a long line of precedents, firmly established,"
is error. Erroneous also is the further statement that "prior to the National Labor Relations Board cases, the court had not permitted the
federal government to intrude at all in commerce conducted wholly
within state borders." Any law student could challenge these statements
by pointing to the famous Shreveport rate case 8 4 which permitted federal regulation of rates of a railroad line lying wholly within the State
of Texas, on the ground that that line competed with an interstate line
and regulation of the intrastate line was necessary for effective regulation
of the interstate. The board of trade and stockyard cases3 5 had permitted
federal regulation of activities no less local than the steel industry on the
ground that they were part of the "stream of commerce."
These concepts are not new. Perhaps the most important single
purpose leading to the adoption of the Constitution was the creation of
a federal government with power to control interstate commerce and
prevent state barriers. True, the Framers did not think of the village
blacksmith as being engaged in interstate commerce, but they emphatically did intend to give Congress control of "that commerce that concerns more states than one,"- 3" and if the steel industry today is not a
merely local activity conducted under the spreading chestnut tree, but is
'NLRB v. Jones !& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615, 81
L. ed. 893 (1937).
In accord: Railroad
"'234 U. S. 342, 34 S. Ct. 833, 58 L. ed. 1341 (1913).
Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. F- Q. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563, 48 S. Ct. 232,
66 L. ed. 371 (1922); Dayton-Goose Creek R. Co. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456,
44. S. Ct. 169, 68 L. ed. 388 (1924).

'Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 42 S.Ct. 397, 66 L. ed. 735 (1922)
Tagg Bros. Z4Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S.420, 50 S.Ct. 220, 74 L. ed.
524 (1930) ;Chicago Board of Trade v. Olson, 262 U. S.1,43 S. Ct. 470, 67 L.
ed. 829 (1923).
"'The words 'among the several states' distinguish between the commerce which
concerns more states than one and that commerce which is confined within one state and
does not affect other states." Hughes, J., in the Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352,
The italicized phrase
398, 33 S. Ct. 729, 57 L. ed. 1511 (1913) (italics added).
w-as first used by Marshall, C. J., in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 194-5, 6 L. ed.

23 (1824).
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a great giant extending its ramifications beyond state lines, it is subject
to federal regulation within the clear intent of the Constitution.
"We must bear in mind," said Alexander Hamilton, "that we are
not to confine our view to the present period, but to look forward to
remote futurity * * * Nothing, therefore, can be more fallacious, than
to infer the extent of any power proper to be lodged in the national government, from an estimate of its immediate necessities. There ought to
be a capacity to provide for future contingencies, as they may happen;
and as these are illimitable in their nature, so it is impossible to limit
3
that capacity."- 7
The prophetic words of Madison are also in point here: "If," he
said, "the people should in future become more partial to the federal than
to the state governments, the change can only result from such manifest
andIirresistible proofs of a better administration, as will overcome all
their antecedent propensities. And in that case, the people ought not
surely to be precluded from giving most of their confidence where they
may discover it to be most due." 38
THE AAA
The court in Mulford v. Smith 39 upheld the second AAA (1938),
in fixing marketing quotas for tobacco. Mr. Sampson indicates his disapproval of the case, but his objections are addressed solely to the wisdom
of the act. Constitutionally, no reason is pointed out why the court
ought to have stricken the act down.
Careful analysis of the case would have revealed an argument, however. The result of the case is impossible to square with Hammer v.
Dagenhart,"4 the famous child labor decision of 19 18. There the court
held that Congress could not prevent the interstate shipment of childmade goods, on the novel ground that the power to control interstate
commerce did not give Congress power to prevent interstate transportation in order to reach evils occurring before the transportation (although
it could do so to prevent evils occurring after transportation, as in the
Mann Act). The AAA of 1938 prevented the interstate marketing of
tobacco grown in excess of quota-a prior evil. The court upheld the
AAA and gave Hammer v.Dagenhart the silent treatment. This indicated to students of constitutional law that Hammer v. Dagenhart was
3 THE FEDERALIST,

No. XXXIV.

'STHE FEDERALIST, No. XLVI.

1307 U. S. 38, 59 S. Ct. 648, 83 L. ed. 1092 (1939).
40247 U. S. 251, 38 S. Ct. 529, 62 L. ed. 1101 (1918).
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on the way out, and they were not surprised when, in 1941, in sustaining the Wage and Hour law, the court overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart
41
expressly.
Why Mr. Sampson neglects the Wage and Hour decision-one of
the few important cases in which the present court has actually overruled
an important precedent--I don't know. 4 2 We can take it that he disapproves. But Hammer L. Dagenhart was certainly wrong, 43 and the
present court in overruling it was right.
CONCLUSION
Some of the cases criticized in the August DICTA involve no new
law, overrule no prior cases, e. g., the TVA and Gold Clause cases. In
those the objection seems to be, not that the court has overthrown precedent, but that it has not. When the new decision is disliked, the court
is scolded for overruling precedent, but when the old law is disliked, the
court is criticized for following precedent.
Other decisions criticized involve the perpetual process of extension
or redefinition of constitutional doctrine. They do not involve the
overthrow of precedent, but merely illustrate that the interpretation of
the broad language of the Constitution must be "adjusted to the various
crises of human affairs." The cases specifically overruled consist mainly
of two decisions of the ultra-conservative court of the previous generation, decisions wholly impossible to justify under the language of the
Constitution. The court in recent years has restored in large measure
the separation of the powers of the legislative, executive and judicial
branches which the court during the preceding half century had gradually been usurping unto itself. It was the trend of decisions from
1890 to 1937 which did violence to the Constitution. In reversing that
trend, the court has not deserted the Constitution but has returned to it.
"United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U. S. 100, 61 S. Ct. 451, 85 L. ed.

395 (1941).

"Also neglected, for some reason, is Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64,
58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. ed. 1188 (1937), overruling the hundred-year-old case of Swift
v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, 10 L. ed. 865 (1842).
In Swift v. Tyson the court had
usurped for the federal courts the power to declare their own common law, "a power
not conferred by the Constitution, and in so doing (had) invaded rights reserved by
the Constitution to the several states."
JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY, 273.
'5 For criticisms of the case see Gordon, The Child Labor Law Case (1918) 32
HARV. L. REV. 45; Powell, The Child Labor Law, the Tenth Amendment, and the
Commerce Clause (1918) 3 So. L. Q. (now TULANE L. REV.) 175.

